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TT IS proposed in this article to "sketch the modern poHtical situa-
*• tion," as the editor suggests, "throughout the whole of Arabia."
Considering the scope of the subject, however, and the variety of its
many angles, even a sketch may overrun the contemplated space.
For the whole of Arabia embraces the country that lies between the
Taurus mountains, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, the Per-
sian Gulf and the hills of Iran—from Aleppo, roughly speaking.
to Aden and from Baghdad to Jerusalem—with a dozen principal
states that are independent of each other and as many rules, primitive
and modern and nondescri])t, ranging between the tribal and the
mandatory.
Geographically, there are no distinctive frontiers between the
north and the south cf the country or between the east and the
west
; but politically the divisions are factual, and educationally they
are conspicuous. The people of the north, of Iraq and Syria and
Palestine, are more educated and, in a modern sense, more progres-
sive than the people of the south of the peninsula proper ; but they
are also mere dependent, economically as well as politically. In the
north there are schools and mandates and political discontent ; in
the south there are no schools of a modern character, no mandates,
and. outside a few of the states along the coasts and around Aden,
no discontent arising from the intervention or the rule of a foreign
power. In the north, one of the four mandatory States, Iraq, has
achieved complete sovereignty, but is not yet so free from foreign
intervention as the Yaman under the Imam Yahya or the dual King-
dom of Hejaz and Najd. In other words, there is more political
independence and less education in the south than there is in the
north
;
and there is in the north a state of things, political, social and
religious, which is not known in the south and which is chiefly the
outcome of a mandatory system of government.
Moreover, the north is a field of intellectual and political forces,
which are dynamic and portentous, still clashing at certain surface
points, but with a tendency nevertheless, even under a system of
foreign supervision and division, to converge, to fuse and consoli-
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date ; while in the south there are material and moral forces, that
is to say the tribes and that religious sway that finds its highest ex-
pression in a tribal solidarity, the greater part of which is today
under the dictatorship of King Ibn Sa'oud. W^hat chance these two
national political currents have of meeting and flowing together in
the future, is a question that concerns, not only Arabia, not only
the Arabic-speaking world, even the world of Islam since Arabia is
overwhelmingly Islamic, but also the leading powers of Europe.
Here in fact is the most important feature, the very core of the sub-
ject ; and after a brief outline of the present political situation in
the various states, it will receive the attention it deserves.
I
Beginning in the north, in the mandated countries, it is well to
recall that the purpose of the Allies at the Conference of Versailles
was to dispose in a nineteenth-century manner, of the territory that
was wrested from the Turks—to the victor belong the spoils. But
the democratic idealism of President Wilson, howsoever received
by the veterans of a cankered diplomacy, overcame the colonization
passion of the leading European powers and finally achieved a tri-
umph in the newly conceived system of the mandate. Here was the
salvation of a people who were not really conquered, who, on the
contrary, had helped the conquerors in the hope of achieving their
emancipation. This was of course guaranteed ; for. besides the
pledges made to King Husein^ and the proclamations to the people of
Iraq- and the people of Syria and Palestine,^ Article XXII of the
Treaty of A>rsailles is in itself the most conclusive. Here is a charter
of rights to the people of the conquered territory. But the skeptics
shook their heads. As an article in a covenant it is unparalleled,
but as a working principle it is destined to failure. The skeptics were
right. There is a gulf, indeed, between the mandate in theorv and
the mandate in practice."*
For this very reason, however, it is bound to succeed in its
initial purpose. Curious as it may seem, the ideal of Woodrow Wil-
son, which has captured the heart of every people aspiring to
emancipation, is proving to be as potent negatively as it was con-
'^Around the Coasts of Arabia, chap. XII, p. 111-12.
2Gen. Maude's Proclamation to the people of Iraq, March 8, 1917.
SThe joint Declaration of Great Britain and France, November, 1918.
4The mandate is divided into three classes. A, B, and C. The reference
in this article is to the Class A Mandate.
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ceived to be in a positive manner. Whether its great author ever
saw it in this light, whether his vision encompassed the happy de-
fauh, which was to be tantamount to the hai)pier achievement, is
doubtful. But there it is standing on its head and accomplishing
the miracle. The Powers are committed to the mandate ; the man-
date can not be put into practice as "a sacred trust of civilization"
;
the yoke of colonization can not be substituted for it ; ergo, the
mandate must be abandoned and the mandated people, having gone
so far in the pursuit of their freedom and learned something of
its modern ideology and practice, must be allowed to continue un-
der another instrument, a treaty, which is consistent with this de-
velopment.
That is what has happened in Irac|. For the League of Nations
and the Mandatory Power have realized that, aside from the cost-
liness of the undertaking, it is futile to continue in the effort to
harmonize—let us concede that such was the case—between the
theory and the practice of the mandate. It may not be so utterly
devoid of good to all the parties concerned that it took ten years
to arrive at this decision. But the people of Iraq have been con-
sistent from the beginning. They never accepted the mandate, and
they continued to struggle against it. I was in Baghdad when the
first treaty between the British Government and the Government
of Iraq was signed (October 10, 1922) ; and in spite of the fact that
the mandate was not mentioned in it and that King Faisal in a pro-
clamation assured the people that it guaranteed to them national
sovereignty and the entrance of Iraq into the League of Nations
four years after the settlement of the boundary dispute with Turkey,
it was accepted under protest.
But the Constituent Assembly, convening in Baghdad a year later,
refused to ratify it without certain amendments ;—the hand was
that of the Treaty, but the voice was that of the Mandate. The de-
bates, the first of their kind in the City of the Khalifs, w^ere fiery
and coruscating. Even a Labor Cabinet, Mr. MacDonald's first, lost
its temper, and with a dramatic gesture threatened to refer the treaty
to the League of Nations, if it was not accepted in toto. The As-
sembly adjourned without taking notice. But the boundary dispute
between Turkey and Iraq offered an opportunity for another threat
—the loss of Mosul—and the Assembly was re-convoked. Out of a
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hundred and ten members only sixty-nine attended. Nevertheless,
the treaty was put to the vote and passed by a very small majority.
But the opposition continued and the agitation for a revision came
to a head four years later, when negotiations were started for an-
other treaty more liberal in terms and more conclusive. King Faisal
and his Prime Minister went to London for this purpose, and after
several interruptions and resumptions of the negotiations, the treaty
was signed (December 14, 1927) and the entrance of Iraq into the
League of Nations was postponed another four years. For this and
other reasons it was not ratified by the Legislative Assembly ; it pre-
cipitated the fall of two Cabinets ; it was a contributory cause of
the suicide of the Prime Minister Sa'doun Pasha; and it remained
the subject of Government negotiations and parliamentary debates
in London and Baghdad until the question of ending the mandate
was ofificially placed before the League of Nations.
Even the final treaty, which actually takes the place of the man-
date, invests Iraq with full sovereignty and makes its membership
in the League a certainty this year, has been opposed by the two
Parties of extreme nationalism ; for the British still retain a foot-
hold in Iraq for the protection of their interests, principally the oil
of Mosul and the air base, already established near Baghdad, in the
line of imperial communications.
What is significant in this whole business of adjusting the rights
of a great and a minor power, however, is that the ten years of a
mandate tempered by treaties, have been a schooling in diplomacy,
as well as in economy and common sense for both parties. The
Iraqis will appreciate the security of their frontiers in the north and
in the south, while continuing to cultivate the friendship of the
Turks and the Wahhabis, and will not look with disdain upon the
revenues of the oil fields : while the British, renouncing the diplo-
macy of creating dangers in frontier disputes to acquire advantages
in treaties—a diplomacy that has lost its mask if not also its cun-
ning—can not but feel satisfaction in the security of a pipe line be-
tween Mosul and Haifa and an air base in Hunaidi, which the Iraq
Government must also safeguard and protect. Other lessons have
been learned. The British will no longer, I think, make any material
sacrifices for the mere maintenance of their prestige in an Oriental
country ; and the Iraqis will no longer indulge in the general de-
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nunciation, at the expense of cv:tting their own throats, of every-
thing British or European.
Let it not be supposed, however, that this present stage in the
political development of Iraq, is due entirely to the opposition of
the extreme nationalists ; for, without attempting to discount their
own contribution, it must also be stated that were they, through their
committees, in direct charge of the negotiations with the British
Government, the success would not have been achieved in such a
measure and within such a short period of time. There is then an-
other factor, which in a sense is more important. Indeed, the head
of a state, especially in the Orient, can still direct or overcome cer-
tain tendencies of good or evil ; and when the state is still in the mak-
ing, like Iraq, the dangers and the prospects are intensified. He
who is at the helm can either make or mar, can become a savior or
a destroyer.
Now, King Faisal's reign did not have an auspicious beginning.
The country was against him—its sufferance for the crown given
under various means of pressure merits little or no consideration
—
and his only real friends were the British. He came to Iraq, and
he stepped up to the throne of Iraq under great disadvantages ; and
while he knew the course he had to take, he saw the difficulties he
had to surmount before he could get to the head of the road. He
could not wear a crown that was to be forever dependent upon a
foreign power ; and he could not be so ungrateful as to ask his peo-
ple, even if he could have led them at that time, to free the crown
from its shackling favor. His problem was singular; but he saw
it clearly and he faced it with dignity, sincerity, and courage.
How to retain the friendship of the British while striving to at-
tain the confidence of the people of Iraq, that was King Faisal's
problem when he came to the throne. Deftly and resolutely, with
pliancy and savoir-faire, alternately open-minded and open-hearted
—if not always convincing, he is always prepossessing—he set him-
self to the task of solving this problem ; and that it took him but
ten years to do so, considering the seriousness of its implications,
national and international, is indeed praiseworthy. While the 0|>-
position was forging weapons against the mandate, he went his way,
through treaty after treaty, to the point which he and the opposition
held in common. Had he surrendered entirely to it, he would cer-
tainly have lost the opportunity to serve its purpose. By the same
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token, had he been more mindful of British favor, he would not
have had the ghost of a chance to bring about the adjustment that is
as favorable to British interests as it is to the national aspirations of
his people. As it is, neither the Arabs of Iraq nor the British can
justly withhold from him their gratitude and their confidence and
support. For the young Kingdom is now free to solve its own prob-
lems in the light of its own particular needs ; and it is hoped that,
with an enlightened ])arliament, a wise and far-seeing monarch, and
a sound system of popular education, it will prove itself quite equal
to the task.
II
A similar state of political and national evolution we do not find
today, unfortunately, in the other mandated countries, in Syria and
Palestine and Trans-Jordan. For although the people of Syria and
Palestine, at least, are not inferior to the people of Iraq in educa-
tion and culture, in social and political development, in national
leadership, they are nevertheless still subject to a mandatory power,
which is floundering, to say the least, with the very instrument of its
authority and realizing, without admitting, the hopelessness of the
venture.
In Syria the situation dees not justify much optimism. What the
French have done in twelve years in dividing and constitutional-
izing the divisions of the country, it will take twenty-five years, un-
der a favorable settled condition, to undo. Whatever were the faults
of the British in Iraq, for instance, they did not cut it up into differ-
ent independent states, when they could have done so. Indeed, they
could have created a Christian state in ]\Iosul as the French did in
IMt. Lebanon ; they could have separated Basrah and invested it with
a sham independence as the French did with the country north of
Lebanon, that strip of coast between Tripoli and Alexandrctta,
which was called the Alawite State ; and they could have allowed
the Kurds to secede and be as free to have any government they
liked, or no government at all, as the Druse in the south of Syria.
Whatever good the French have done in their mandated terri-
tory, conceding that such good would not have been possible with-
out them, as the building of roads, for instance, and the settlement
of frontier questions, can not efiface the evil of dividing the coun-
try and deepening wherever it was possible the breach between its
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people in the name of religion and sectarianism. Even in the
Lebanon Republic sectarianism is the constitutional basis of repre-
sentation in the Legislative Assembly ; and this Republic, whose Con-
stitution is Paris-made, is body and soul, even as its ardent apolo-
gists will tell you, under the thumb of the High Commissioner. If
there was a wish to make it non-sectarian, progressive, and to give
it a freer native hand, neither the Legislative Assembly nor the
Government nor the people. I am sure, would protest. But there it is
a Jesuitical creation, a twentieth-century engine with an eighteenth-
century boiler ; and when the explosion takes place, it will not be
the fault of the French—Oh, no ! It will be attributed to native in-
competency, and the League of Nations will be told that the Le-
banese are net yet fit for self-government.
And what have the French done in Syria during the past ten
years, or since the mandate was issued? They have set up and
changed three provisional governments in the effort to discharge the
first duty^ imposed upon them by the League. But the mandate has
been in force since the summer of 1922, and Syria is still without
an organic law, without a constitutional government. To be in de-
fault seven years and be still struggling with the problem of their
first obligation, is not a record that can be conscientiously recom-
mended. If a minor power, holding this mandate, had shown no
better record in ten years, the League, it is not unreasonable to sup-
pose, would have relieved it of its responsibility.
It must be said that France has contributed substantially to her
own difficulties in Syria by antagonizing the forces of nationalism
and allying herself with the forces of reaction. Not one of the
three provisional governments referred to commanded the confi-
dence of the country, or was sufficiently popular to be able to
act as an intermediary between the French and their antagonists.
On the contrary, the head of every provisional government—such
is the innate defect of the heritage of bureaucratic fidelity—was
more royal than the king, which was most unfortunate both to the
nationalists and the French. For if Syria, like Iraq, had a responsi-
ble head, responsible primarily to the country and not unconscious
of his other responsibility, the negotiations for a treaty to take the
5The First Article of the Mandate says that "the jMandatory Power shall
frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this
mandate, an organic law for Syria and Mt. Lebanon."
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place of the mandate would have heen equally successful.
But France is still hopeful and undaunted. The present High
Coniiiiissioner, the patient and silent Ponsot, who has been strug-
gling for the past five years with the First .\rticle of the Mandate,
may yet, by a happy chance, succeed. A national government in
Damascus and a I'Vancn-Syrian treaty may soon become a reality
more through the pressure of circumstance,—the development, for
instance, in Iraq—than any inspiration of his own or of the Quay
d' Orsay.
His record up to the present time consists chiefly of several dead-
locks followed by trips to Paris. In the spring of 1928 the Syrian
Constituent Assembly drafted a constitution, six clauses of which,
he declared, were unacceptable ;^ and in the repeated conferences
between him and the leaders of the Assembly, he could not per-
suade them to accept his views. To Paris then for consultation.
But he returned as he went: the Quay d'Orsay was inexorable.
The nationalists at that juncture offered a compromise, which seemed
most reasonable. They were willing to modify the clause about a
united Syria and to strike out of the constitution the other five
clauses on condition that they be embodied in the treaty that was
to be concluded with France. Rut the treaty-idea was not relished
at that time by the French Government, who insisted on the elim-
ination of the six clauses, because, it was argued they made its po-
sition as a mandatory untenable. The mandate, the nationalists re-
plied, is a temporary agreement, while the constitution is a perma-
nent document and should contain, or exact as a pledge, the neces-
sary provisions for safeguarding the rights of Syria as an indepen-
dent state. But the mandate is in force, the French rebutted, and
it should have priority over a document that is still under negotia-
tions: the mandate must be uncnnditi(Mially recognized. The na-
tionalist said, no ; and the Constituent Assembly was prorogued sine
die.
During the year that followed the country was on the verge of
another political disturbance. Damascus closed its shops in pro-
test with the nationalists against the action of the High Commis-
6The six clauses referred to (1) the unity of Syria, or all the lands
within the natural pre-war boundary of the country, (2) the organization
of a national army, (3) the appointment of diplomatic representatives abroad,
(4) the grantinp of pardons and general amnesty, (5) the declaration of
martial law, and (6) the right of negotiating treaties with foreign powers.
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sioner, resolutions were adopted to stand fast against the mandate,
threats were made to lay the draft constitution before the League
of Nations, and the newspapers began to preach a campaign of
civil disobedience. Very soon after that, in April, Monsieur Ponsot
returned from Paris to announce the birth of the Syrian Republic.
His coming this time was hailed with expectation.
But he had in his portfolio, alas, four Paris-made constitutions
instead of one; and when they were ofificially published (May 22,
1930), there was joy in Geneva and Paris and there were lamenta-
tions in Damascus and Aieppo. Even America was hasty in hail-
ing a sister republic ; the Xezi.' York Times, itself, offering an ori-
son and confusing Lebanon with Syria, rejoiced to see "the goodly
cedar" put forth boughs again and the prophecy of Isaiah fulfiled.
But the "goodly cedar" was not included in the Syrian Republic
;
nor were the other States—the Alawite, the Druse ^Mountain, and
the autonomous city of Alexandretta—each of which had a consti-
tution of its own ! The unity of Syria was reduced to the Four
Cities and the Desert." But the nationalists did not capitulate, and
it did not take ^Monsieur Ponsot long to realize that he had to
make another trip to Paris. It was a long trip this time, for it en-
tailed a visit to Geneva. Meanwhile there were whispers, which
certainly reached the Quay d'Orsay, that the nationalists were
weakening and that the talk, started in Paris, of making King Faisal
King of both Syria and Iraq, brought confusion to their councils
and created a split in their ranks.
That is why perhaps Alonsieur Ponsot returned this time wuth
more heart than ever. His proclamation the day after his arrival
(November, 1931) was the sensation of his career. The most un-
popular of provisional governments, Tajedin Hasani's, was abol-
ished—there was rejoicing for a spell in the Four Cities for that
—a day was set for the election of a national assembly, and an ad-
ministrative council, made up of Francophile timber including the
heads of all the defunct provisional governments and only one na-
tionalist, the President of the Group Hashem Bey Attasi, was ap-
pointed by the High Commissioner to take charge of affairs under
"Damascus, Hims, Hama, and Aleppo are the four leading cities of
Syria. The Arabs of the deserts, principally the Ruwallas and the 'Aneizas
are now taking an active interest in politics; the Ruwallas under Nuri Sha'-
lan are pro-French, while the 'Anezas and their allies, under the leadership
of Ibn Muhaid, are nationalists.
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his direct supervision during the said election. In reaHty it was a
government ad iiitcriiii by the mandatory and its henchmen, who
assured the country that the elections would be free of all ofificial
and non-ofticial interference, of coercion, intimidation, and every
other unlawful means of persuasion.
But the 5th of January, 1932, was not a feather in the cap of
Monsieur Ponsot. It was a day of riots at the polls and later in
the streets, the ])()lice, the city watchmen, and the French troops
participating. Tanks and machine guns were also used to disperse
the crowds and reestablish order. In the two principal cities, Da-
mascus and Aleppo, the casualties were twelve dead and about thirty
wounded. The elections were discontinued. Outside the big cities,
however, they were, with one or two exceptions, peaceful and they
resulted in the defeat of most of the nationalist candidates. In Alep-
po, too, when they were repeated the following month, after the
authorities had sentenced to forced absence one of the nationalist
leaders and imprisoned three others, the nationalists were defeated
by their opponents. But in Damascus, Hama, and a few other places
the elections were postponed indefinitely.
These, very briefly, are the facts. But who is responsible for
the riots and the resulting bloodshed? That the French authorities
were in full contrril on that day, is beyond question. That the elec-
toral law was published the previous week by all the newspapers,
and that the secondary electors knew what were their rights and
their duties, is also true. According to a clause in the electoral law,
the official at the poll has to open the ballot box for the secondary
electors, show them that it is empty, and then seal it in their pres-
ence before they place in it their ballots. In connection with this
rule, the truth of the incident in Damascus that precipitated the first
riot, seems to be well established. One of the electors, a nationalist,
asked that the ballot box be opened and shown and then sealed, ac-
cording to the law, before the vote is taken. This was refused
—
"these are the boxes and these are our orders,'' said the official
and the man was roughly handled and forced out of the place by
the police.
According to the nationalists, this is one of the many like inci-
dents that took place in Damascus, in Aleppo, and in other cities
even at one of the polls of the Arabs of the desert. They accuse
the Government and its henchmen of packing the ballot boxes with
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the names of their own candidates and sending them sealed—loaded
dice !—to the polls. On the other hand, the Government accuses
the nationalists of having deliberately precipitated the riots, be-
cause they were not certain of winning the election as they did in
the spring of 1928. At the present writing. Monsieur Ponsot, still
silent and patient, stands in midstream between a blood-bespattered
election that is only half finished and a country that is still in the
parturient pains of the birth of a republic. May the divinity of
circumstance, working through Baghdad or Paris or Geneva, be of
favor—and the sooner the better.^
Ill
There may be something, too, up the sleeve of the said Divinity
to favor Palestine. For the situation there, after the late Labor
Government had given it a good airing and then made a mess of
the various means of an attempted solution, is not much better
than it was prior to August, 1929. The chance of a rapprochement
between the Arabs and the Zionists was destroyed by Mr. Mac
Donald in his letter to Dr. Weizmann explaining—in reality dis-
claiming—the Passfield White Paper. Since then the Zionists have
been recuperating ; and the upheaval of their last general confer-
ence at Basel is as significant as its reafifirmations. It may mean, in
the world of Jewry, a more solid front ; but it also reflects the dan-
ger of the situation in Palestine. For Zionism there is going through
a crisis, economic and agricultural, which is unprecedented in the
last ten years of its history, and the factional forces, within the
general frame, are becoming more agitated and more centrifugal.
The attempt to reenforce the frame from without, may partly suc-
ceed ; morally and politically it is possible ; but financially—another
$5,000,000,000. for temporary relief from America, for instance,
—
there is little or no hope. The Arabs, however, are no longer laboring
under any illusion. Their press may be cocksure of the bankruptcy
of Zionism in Palestine, but their leaders are taking nothing for
granted.
8In electing the representatives there was a compromise between the
Mandatory Government and the nationalists, and the president—the first
president of the Syrian Republic, Mohammed Bey AH al-'Abed—was also
a compromise candidate. He is one of the richest men in Syria and was once
Turkish Ambassador in Washington.
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The Grand Mufti, Ilajj Amin ul-IIusaini, looms bigger and
stronger today, in spite of the opposition of the moderates under
the leadership of the Mayor of Jerusalem, Ragheb Bey Xashashiby.
But just as every Zionist of whatever shade is for a national home
in Palestine, so every Arab, whether moderate or extremist, is anti-
Zionist. Local politics, personal ambition and family rivalries have
much to do with the dissension. Aside from these, who of the two
leaders is better at the helm depends upon the circumstances sur-
rounding the issue. After the Passfield White Paper, the leadership
of Ragheb Bey would have been more practical and beneficial ; for
he could speak the language and command the forces of peace which
the Zionists would understand and respect. But after the letter of
Premier Mac Donald to Dr. Weizmann, or when the issue calls for
fighting strength and maneuvering skill, Plajj Amin is the man.
But London, where both of these leaders are known, has a dif-
ferent opinion ; and I deem it my duty, as an Oriental who holds
out modestly a rushlight of understanding, to correct it. In political
circles there I heard it said that the Grand Mufti and the other Arab
leaders, excepting Ragheb Bey Nashashiby, are what they call
"duds." The ]\Iufti himself is like a village preacher who still attacks
from his pulpit the Darwinian theory. But Ragheb Bey is modern
and progressive. This is partly true. Ragheb Bey is cosmopolitan,
and he cuts more ice in London than a turbaned Hajji or a shaikh
of Al-Azhar. But he can also be more misleading. He can be a Dar-
winian in London, if that will help London to better appreciate his
political point of view ; and he can be in Jerusalem even a revision-
ist when there is hope in it for an understanding with the Jews:
but in neither instance does he yield aught of the integrity of his
faith. This inconsistency on the surface is misleading ; as a bit of
color in his cosmopolitanism it is attractive but not convincing. And
in the East, where a certain indelibility, though it conceal a sore
spot, is still considered a virtue in leadership, it is even compromising.
Be it moreover remembered that the East is emotional and that
religion is still its strongest emotion. Given two equally strong men,
therefore, especially in certain parts of the Muslem world, the one
that wears a turban has more pull—invisible like the moon's—than
the one in a hat or a fez. I hold no brief for the turbaned gentry;
I know what they are on the whole : a bad man in a turban can
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bring misery and destruction to a whole community, to a nation.
But a strong and honest man in a jiihhah and turban—London may
find him a bit gauche, a bit stiff, pompous perhaps and otherwise
inexpressive, intellectually at an ebb, socially impossible, even out-
landish. He, too, to London is misleading on the surface, and a
little under the surface. But instead of two truths, he has a sin-
gle mind w^ith a dozen lights—native torches, as it were,—for its
supreme purpose. These lights did not shine in London, and the
Grand Mufti was classed among "duds."
But he has pulling power, this man ; and that in politics, high or
low, is not to be contemned. His recent outstanding achievement is
the General Muslem Conference held in Jerusalem last December.
It was feared, it was opposed: certain European powers tried to
upset it; but he pulled it through. From every part of the Mus-
lem world, came representatives with grievances that were publicly
expressed and others that were privately discussed and recorded.
The programme of the Conference encompassed all the vital needs,
religious and cultural, educational and industrial, social and poli-
tical, of the Muslems of the world. From a university to be es-
tablished in Jerusalem to the question of the Hejaz Railway, is a
scope ; the defense of the holy places, a bureau of propaganda and
a national fund, are other subjects; but over and underlying all is
the question of combatting and overcoming Zionism in Palestine.
Here are the Arabs' front-line trenches, and Hajj Amin-ul-Husaini
is the chief recruiting and commandeering officer. There should
be a base of supplies, he made it understood, in every Muslem
country. But Ibn Sa'oud, before him, once tried the Muslem world ;9
and it remains to be seen whether Hajj Amin will be more success-
ful. The Jerusalem Conference, morally and to a certain extent
politically, was a success ; and even within its realities it is bound
to add to the difficulties of both the British and the Zionists in
Palestine. Outside pressure is seldom ineffective.
But the Arabs of Palestine are not depending wholly upon out-
side pressure. At the General Palestine Conference held in Nablus
last September resolutions were passed (1) to adopt the Ghandi
policy of non-cooperation and civil disobedience; (2) to promote
native industry by boycotting Jewish: and European goods; (3) to
9A General Muslem Conference was held in Mecca in the summer of
1926, under the auspices of King Ibn Sa'oud.
Courtesy uf tlic Xatio)wl Geographic Magacine
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oppose any move fnr an understanding with the Jews of Palestine
so long as Zionism continues to menace the national rights and as-
pirations of the Arabs; (4) to continue the campaign for general
and permanent contributions to the national fund; (5) to stop sell-
ing land to the Jews, and (6) to organize local committees through-
out the country for the efifective enforcement of these resolutions.
But the question of a national fund, at both Conferences, was
paramount ; and the representatives at the Jerusalem Conference
pledged themselves to organize branch committees in their respec-
tive countries to carry on the campaign for general permanent con-
tributions. This fund is to be used, not only for the purpose of
propaganda, but also to help the Arab farmer, by loan or purchase,
and thus prevent him from selling in sheer need his land to the Jews.
As for the British, their position in Palestine is becoming more
untenable than ever. Events are moving fast, and the press of cir-
cumstances is reaching to the core of the problem. Indeed, it is
hard to see how the British Government, now that the mandate in
Iraq is abolished, can consistently uphold, to say nothing of the
hopeless task of enforcing, a mandate in Palestine. But already
there are alarums and excursions that presage something dramatic.
Diplomacy is moving slowly down stage to publish a secret long
withheld. The British are evidently tired of the Arabs and the
Jews, and their real interests in Palestine are centered in Haifa.
or the end of the pipe line of the oil of Mosul and the terminus of
a contemplated railroad across the desert. There may be, too, an
air base in the line of imperial communications.
Xow. if any one can adequately protect these interests* and is
willing to shoulder the troubles of Arab and Jew—and is acceptable
in this capacity to his neighbors, to Egypt and Syria and Ibn Sa'oud
and ?\Iustapha Kemal, even if he is only partly acceptable—Great
Britain mav be willing to sign the deed and wash her hands of "the
sacred trust of civilization." A king! The Holy Land for a king!
And Abbas Helmi, the ex-Khedive of Eg>'pt, has of late been go-
ing up and down the world, visiting Angora, Syria, Jerusalem,
Geneva; and Lord Reading came on a pilgrimage to Palestine and
there met by chance the ex-Khedive; and the High Commissioner
for Palestine went to Cairo to see his Colleague there and incidental-
ly pay his respects to King Fuad ; and the Premier of Egypt Sidki
Pasha went to Beirut, the seat of the French High Commissioner,
822 THE OPEN COURT
for no reason of health or over-work—all these innocent peregrin-
ations within the months of January and February of 1932. That is
why I say events are moving fast in Palestine, as well as in Iraq.
IV
Beyond Palestine and in the Peninsula there is less immobility
than usual, but little or no speed. In Trans-Jordan as well as in
the States along the coast of the Persian Gulf, i.e., Kuwait, Bahrain,
Trucial Oman, and Mascat, the relations of the British Government
with the native rulers is, as the address from the throne might truly
say, peaceful and friendly. There is an awakening among the people,
however, which is finding expression in a demand for more schools,
but is not yet strong enough as an element of protest against the
"peaceful and friendly" relations between the controlling power
and the dependent, the practically nominal native sovereigns. This
is particularly true of Trans-Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain, where
the progress in popular education is somewhat compensating for
the political backwardness of the state. Trans-Jordan itself, an
artificial creation of the post-war politics of the Allies, might be
the first to be affected by any eventful change in Palestine or any
unexpected development in the politics of King Ibn Sa'oud.
Of the other States along the coasts of Arabia, Hadhramout is
in the same category with Mascat, and the Protectorates around
Aden are still the subject of dispute, of open hostility between the
British and the independent ruler of the Yaman, the Imam Yahya.
The dream of extending Yaman sovereignty to what is considered
its natural boundary to the south and southeast, to Aden and Had-
hramout, is still cherished by the Imam. But his recent activities
have been more to the north and there was fear at one time of a
clash with King Ibn Sa'oud. How the dispute was settled deserves
to be broadcast throughout the world. To the powers of Europe, to
the League of Nations, to all those who are working for universal
peace, an Arab ruler has set an example unique in history. Let
me tell briefly of this otherwise insignificant aflfair.
The Idrisi territory, Asir, along the coast of the Red Sea, be-
tween the Yaman and the Hejaz, has been shrinking for the past
eight years in both directions. The Imam Yahya invaded and oc-
cupied a section of it up to Midi ; the Wahhabis had long before oc-
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cupied Abha and the mountains around it; and the Saiyed Hasan
ul-Idrisi, who feared the further encroachment of the Imam, con-
ckided with King Ibn Sa'oud a treaty (October, 1926), which placed
under that king's protection what he still held of Asir. Since then the
relations between the two independent rulers, Ibn Sa'oud and the
Imam, have been on the whole friendly ; but last year the Yaman
soldiers occupied a mountain called 'Aru, which was claimed by
the Asiris to be of Asir and by the Yamanis as Yaman territory.
The Wahhabi soldiers, therefore, to protect the rights of the Idrisi,
moved upon the soldiers of the Imam Yahya, and there was an
encounter. The Imam protested to Ibn Sa'oud, and after an ex-
change of notes, they agreed to have a joint commission of Najdis
and Yamanis meet in Asir, investigate the case, and decide to whom
Mt. 'Aru belonged.
The commission met, investigated, and disagreed. Whereupon
the Imam wrote to his representatives saying that he was willing to
have Ibn Sa'oud himself decide the case and that he would accept his
decision whatever it be. Ibn Sa'oud was overcome. "How can I,"
he said, "when my opponent appeals to me, decide in my own
favor? No, the Imam Yahya can not be more generous than Ibn
Sa'oud. Mt. 'Aru is of the territory of the Yaman, and we are all
Arabs, It makes no difference if it changes hands." Civilized Eu-
rope and America, please note.
King Abd ul-Aziz ibn Sa'oud and the Imam Yahya ibn Hamid
ud-Din, the rulers respectively of the United Kingdom of the He-
jaz and Najd and of the Yaman, are the two most prominent per-
sonalities in the Peninsula today. They are both expansionists with
a Pan-Arab dream ; they are both religious leaders of their respec-
tive sects, the Wahhabis and the Zaidis, and they are both now
adopting a policy of peaceful penetration. Even though indepen-
dent in their sovereignty, however, they both still depend more or
less upon the good-will of the British Government.
But there is a marked difiference in their personal traits. The
Imam is austere and unbending, taciturn and secretive ; King Abd'
ul-Aziz is breezy and engaging, outspoken and direct ; the Imam
is narrow and exclusive in his religious attitude, even towards non-
Zaidi Muslems, King Abd'ul-Aziz can be tolerant and hospitable
;
the Imam is devious and hesitating in making and executing his
plans. King Abd'ul-Aziz is slow in planning and quick in execu-
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tion : hut the Imam is strong in his mountain isolation, while Ibn
Sa'oud's power in a realm that reaches from sea to sea, including
vast desert spaces, has in it an inherent weakness.
There is another difference arising out of the reactionary and
often selfish attitude of that somewhat privileged class in the realm
of both; namely, the saiycds of the Yaman and the ulcnm of Najd.
The Imam in dealing with the saiycds is not so independent and
so sure, so alternately pliant and inexorable according to the need
of the moment, and consequently not so successful as King Ibn
Sa'oud is with his iilenia. This may be one reason why the Pan-
Arabism of the former is more religious than racial, while that of
the latter is fast becoming more racial than religious.
These two rulers, who in their rivalry for power have come so
close to each other in Asir, have realized, like all the other leaders
in the Aral) world, the deep truth of the lesson of the last ten years
—salvation throuj^h solidarity. Indeed, only by a united front can
they hold their own and be in friendly relations with their neigh-
bors to the north, the Turks, and to the east, the Persians, as well
as with the European powers, especially Great Britain and France
and Italy, who still exercise an influence in their affairs. But only
by organizing their forces and layint;; the foundations of peace
among themselves through mutual ti^ood-will and understanding, can
they show a united front.
The settlement of the ]\It. 'Aru question is an example of how
this is being done; the meeting of King Faisal and King Ibn Sa'oud
in the winter of 1930 and the subsequent treaty of peace and friend-
ship between Xajd and Iraq, is another ; and not less significant are
the ( fficial visits in the summer of 1*^31 of an Iraq delegation to
Sana and another headed by the I'rime Minister Xouri Pasha Sa'id
to Mecca for the jnuq^ose of discussini^ with the Imam Yahya and
Kin<,r Ibn Sa'oud the ])reliniinaries of an Arab federation.
.\si(le from these official activities, the popular interest, which
is gaining in extension and intensity day by day, is beginning to
crystallize and to have a. voice and a course of procedure. After
the General ^luslem Conference previously referred to, a group of
Arabs, Muslems and Christians from Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Trans-
Jordan, and the Peninsula, held a meeting in Jerusalem on the 13th
of December, 1931, and the following pledge was taken under oath
by even' one present:
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First —To uphold the integrity of Arabia as a nation and to
recognize no divisions therein.
Second—To direct the efforts in every Arab State towards the
one goal of complete independence and complete unity,
and to oppose every movement and every idea that has
the tendency of making paramount local and divisional
politics.
Third —To oppose colonization to the utmost in every form,
because it is inconsistent with the dignity and the su-
preme purpose of the Arab nation.
A resolution was also adopted to hold in the very near future a
Pan-Arab convention.
Let it not be supposed, however, that the success of the move-
ment depends entirely upon the Arabs themselves. For Great
Britain and France, even when all the mandates are abolished, will
still have, as I have shown, interests in the country ; and the right
to safeguard them, even though circumscribed by treaties, can be
invoked even at the instance of the least fear and suspicion.
Frankly, the complete success of the Pan-Arab movement,
whether it results in a single empire or in a federation of states
or kingdoms, depends upon the honest intention and the good-will
of Great Britain and France, as well as upon the national and pro-
gressive spirit of the Arabs themselves. Moreover, the economic
and educational factors are just as essential as the political. It may
be said, therefore, that complete success depends upon five principal
points
:
1. The control of the nomad tribes and the establishment
of law and ordier among them through the urbanizing process
instituted by King Ibn Sa'oud. In other words, to transform
the nomad population into peasants and make them producing
and law-abiding citizens.
2. The withdrawal from the various petty States of so-called
British protection, the discontinuance of the corruptive and
nefarious system of stipends, and the transfer of the agree-
ments the British Government has with the different small
rulers along the coast of the Persian Gulf to Ibn Sa'oud and
around Aden to the Imam Yahya, who will pledge them-
selves to protect British interests on the two routes to India,
that is to say across the desert and through the Gulf and
Red Sea.
3. The granting by the sovereign rulers of economic conces-
826 THE OPEN COURT
sions to mixed corporations composed of foreigners and na-
tives, the foreigners to furnish also tlie technical knowledge,
where it is needed, for the development of the resources of
the country, provided that such foreign capital and technical
skill are free from imperialistic interests and political control.
4. The establishment of national schools with a uniform
liberal programme of education in the Peninsula as well as
in the northern territories.
5. The inclusion in the treaties with the northern States, i.e.,
Iraq and Syria and I'alestine. of a clause sanctioning the unity
of these States with each other and with the other States in
the Peninsula, provided such unity does not affect any pre-
vious commitment regarding the interests of the other signa-
tory powers.
The first and the fourth of these five points—the urbanizing of
the r>cduin ])opulation and the national schools—have already been
started and are being continued with considerable success.
The second and the fifth—the change in British policy in the
Peninsula and the unity-clause in the treaties—must come inevit-
ably, logically, since Great Britain and France, abandoning the
mandate, must rely upon the principle of reciprocity for safeguard-
ing their interests and maintaining their prestige in the Near East.
The third point—the granting of concessions—depends upon the
fulfilment of the second and the fifth. That is to say, if the inter-
ested Powers. Great Britain and France, cooperate with the Arabs
for the sake of peace and progress, as well as for reciprocal ad-
vantages, instead of impeding and opposing their activities to paci-
fy and unify their country, foreign capital and technical skill for the
development of its natural resources will be gladly admitted.
The most important of these points—the control of the nomad
population and the national schools—depends wholly upon the Arabs
themselves. Neither the French in Syria, for instance, nor the Brit-
ish in Iracj could achieve, in their relations with the Arabs of the
northern desert, a fraction of the success of Ibn Sa'oud in Central
Arabia : neither of them could fully control the tribes, even when
they had to bribe their chiefs ; and neither Great Britain nor France
was sympathetic, to say the least, to a uniform national system of
public education. These must come from within, from the Arabs
themselves, and they are now on the path of fulfilment.
The other points must logically, inevitably follow ; but let us
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hope that they will follow, not as a result of force, but as the natural
development of a policy, national and international, that is consis-
tent with the progressive and humanitarian spirit of civilization.
After all, this Arab movement is but an expression in Arabic of
what has been and is still an expression in English, in French, in
German, in Hindustani—an expression of national progress and
human development. Upon it depends the future of Arabia, and
upon it in a large measure depends the peace of the world. It is
in this sense a world-movement and it may be summed up in three
words : pacification, unification, education.
